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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
the court in the instant case may indicate that in the future the
federal courts will question more strenuously the qualifications
of a juror who has served on a previous case of a similar nature
in which the same prosecuting witnesses were used.
Fred Adkins
Evidence-Competency of Husband and Wife to Testify
to Nonaccess During Time of Conception
P, a married woman, accused D who was not her husband of
being the father of her child. During the trial P testified over objec-
tion by D, that she had been separated from her husband for more
than one year prior to the birth of the child, that she had seen him
only four times during that period, and that on all of these occasions
there were other witnesses present. The husband, also over objection
by D, corroborated P's testimony. D was convicted of bastardy. A
motion to set aside the verdict and award a new trial was overruled.
D appealed. Held, reversed and remanded. In a bastardy pro-
ceeding instituted by a married woman, in the absence of a
statute authorizing the spouses to testify as to nonaccess, they were
incompetent to testify to that fact. The admission of such testi-
mony constituted prejudicial error. State ex rel. Worley v. Lav-
ender, 131 S.E.2d 752 (W. Va. 1963).
The presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock is
one of the strongest known to law. Bariuan v. Bariuan, 186 Kan.
605, 352 P.2d 29 (1960). In the early days of the law there was
a conclusive presumption of legitimacy of a child born in marriage.
Therefore, testimony by the husband and wife as to nonaccess
would have been immaterial. Regina v. Murry, I Salk. 122, 91
Eng. Rep. 115 (K.B. 1706). As time passed this ancient doctrine
was repudiated, and it became possible to question the legitimacy
of a child born in wedlock. Pendrell v. Pendrell, 2 Stra. 925, 93 Eng.
Rep. 495 (K.B. 1732); 7 WicMom, EvmENcE § 2063 (3d ed. 1940).
After the presumption became rebuttable a rule arose that a
married woman was a competent witness to testify to the non-
access of her husband during the time of conception. Because
of interest, however, a wife's testimony uncorroborated by other
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witnesses could not bastardize the child. Rex v. Reading, 95 Eng.
Rep. 49 (K.B. 1734). At first, this rule was limited strictly to
nonsupport proceedings, but later it was applied to other situations
and was expanded to include the testimony of the husband. 7
W GmotE, op. cit. supra at 359.
The rule set out in Rex v. Reading, supra, was ignored by Lord
Mansfield when he stated that a husband and wife were in-
competent to testify as to nonaccess during the time of conception.
Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (K.B. 1777).
However, a spouse may testify to any other fact relevant to the
issues such as adultery of the wife and nonaccess itself may be
proven by other witnesses. Pope v. Kincaid, 99 W. Va. 677, 129
S.E. 752 (1925). The Lord Mansfield rule was adopted in the
United States without challenge, and the majority of jurisdictions
continue to follow it. Shatford v. Shatford, 214 Ark. 612, 217
S.W.2d 917 (1949); Zutavern v. Zutavern, 155 Neb. 395, 52 N.W.2d
254 (1952); Holmes v. Clegg, 113 W. Va. 449, 48 S.E.2d 438 (1948);
see 60 A.L.R. 380, 381 (1929).
Lord Mansfield's rule was not based on disqualification because
of the wife's interest. Rather, it was based on morality, decency,
and public policy. Goodright v. Moss, supra. There seems to be
little logic to the fact that the doctrine disallows the spouses'
testimony as to nonaccess and yet permits the husband to testify
to the wife's infidelity or the wife to avow to her adultery. In
Kennedy v. State, 117 Ark. 113, 173 S.W. 842 (1915), the court
heartily approved Lord Mansfield's rule and added that such
testimony was delicate and personal. The court stated that such
testimony would scandalize the marital relationship. The opinion
failed to explain why the mention of nonaccess is so indecent and
yet testimony concerning the wife's adultery is not. The Mississippi
court has pointed out that to follow the Lord Mansfield rule would
be to protect the unfaithful wife and her lover, both of whom
have grossly violated the sanctity of marriage. Further, it would
refuse the husband the right to be heard, and force him to remain
tied to an adulterous wife and to acknowledge and support a
child which was in fact not his. Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 383,
172 So. 317 (1937). Though a majority of states still follow the
Lord Mansfield rule, some states have abrogated it by statute,
Cinders v. Lewis, 93 Cal. 2d 90, 208 P.2d 687 (1949); Loudon v.
Loudon, 114 N.J.Eq. 242, 168 Aft. 840 (1933); or by judicial de-
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cision, Commonwealth v. Rosenblatt, 219 Mass. 197, 106 N.E. 852
(1914); Moore v. Smith, supra.
In West Virginia, by statute, a wife who has been living separate
and apart from her husband for one year or more prior to the
birth of the child, may accuse any person other than her husband
of being the father of her child, in like manner and under the
same proceedings as if she were unmarried. W. VA. CODE ch. 48,
art. 7, § 1 (Michie 1962). This statute and the nonsupport statute,
W. VA. CODE ch. 48, art. 8 § 1 (Michie 1962), are to be read pari
materia in the judicial determination of the paternity of the child.
Holmes v. Clegg, supra; State v. Mills, 121 W. Va. 205, 2 S.E.2d
278 (1939). Both statutes have as their purpose the prevention of
the child becoming a burden on the state. State v. Hoult, 113
W. Va. 587, 169 S.E. 241 (1933). In State ex rel. Crouser v. Mercer,
141 W. Va. 691, 92 S.E.2d 745 (1956), the court stated that these
statutes were remedial and should be construed liberally to
effectuate their purpose.
In the principal case the court based its decision on State v.
Reed, 107 W. Va. 563, 149 S.E. 669 (1929). In that case the con-
viction in a bastardy proceeding was reversed because the mother
admitted that she and her husband had not been separated for
at least one year prior to the birth of the child. The case seems
to imply that she and her husband would have been competent to
testify concerning the nonaccess issue if they had been separated
for a period of one year or more during the time that the child
was conceived. The court stated that the bastardy statute was
a modification of the Lord Mansfield rule, yet cited cases with
approval which strictly upheld the rule.
The dissenting opinion in the principal case stated that the
bastardy statute in West Virginia gave a new remedy to a married
woman; that once she had met the separation requirement of
the statute she could proceed as if she were unmarried. To meet
this requirement, she must prove the absence of cohabitation with
her husband during the year preceding the child's birth. As a
practical matter if the Lord Mansfield rule is followed the right
given to a married woman by the legislature is of little benefit
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